Late-night inspection, fraudulent use of seized cards, passport, an inventory full of "etc."
In criminal cases, people tend to focus on provocative LINE messages or the contents of transaction flowcharts. However, there are things that must be checked before that.
Is that evidence really the same as when it was seized? Who touched it, where was it transported, what was copied, and what is missing? If only a part of the electronic data is extracted and used as evidence of a conspiracy, the continuity of its acquisition and management must be explained.
In the case of Mr. Shigenori Kanemoto, multiple questions have been raised regarding procedures prior to the evidence itself, including late-night inspections, questioning while in poor health, the specificity of the seizure inventory, the handling of passports, and the fraudulent use of credit cards after seizure.
Information indicates that the inspection of Mr. Shigenori Kanemoto exceeded 1 AM.
According to information obtained by the prosecutors' union, the investigation by the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau was continued past 11:00 p.m. and even past 1:00 a.m., despite Shigenori Kanamoto repeatedly complaining of feeling unwell.
Depending on whether the investigation on the day was a voluntary investigation based on the ordinary statutory authority of questioning and inspection or a criminal tax investigation based on a judge's warrant, the applicable legal framework differs.
However, in either case, if an explanation obtained when memory and judgment are impaired due to extreme fatigue or illness is later used with the claim that "the person admitted it" or "they could not explain," its credibility and voluntariness become problematic.
The length of time spent late into the night may demonstrate the diligence of the investigation, but it does not guarantee the accuracy of the statements.
What on earth is to be returned with a seizure inventory full of "etc."
According to those involved, there are complaints that the seizure inventory prepared by the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau uses the comprehensive term "etc." for numerous items, making it impossible for the owners to accurately grasp what and how many items were seized.
The purpose of the inventory is to identify the seized items. Descriptions such as "devices, etc.," "documents, etc.," and "recording media, etc." alone make it impossible to verify whether everything was returned upon release, whether items belonging to third parties were mixed in, or whether data remains left behind as copies.
With an inventory where you don't know what was seized, if something goes missing you won't know how many were lost, and if you return the wrong items you won't be able to tell. Rather than an inventory, that's just a memo by a state agency saying, "We probably took around this much."
Was it necessary to seize Shigenori Kanemoto's passport?
A passport is an important document related to identity verification and international travel. In this case, it is reported that Shigenori Kanemoto's passport was seized, that it took time to be returned, and that confusion arose regarding the confirmation of his whereabouts.
The Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau should explain whether it was necessary to retain the original passport for a long period as evidence of a tax evasion case, whether a copy would not have sufficed, and whether the purpose of preventing flight was included.
It is said that Shigenori Kanemoto was engaged in overseas business. For this reason, being unable to use a passport for a long period of time has a significant impact on his business and livelihood. If he retained it even after the necessity was lost, the proportionality of the restriction comes into question.
Fraudulent use of credit cards seized by the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau
The Prosecutors Union has received information that fraudulent use occurred after the seizure of credit cards placed under the control of the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau.
According to explanations from those involved, when asked about this issue, the person in charge gave the response, to the effect of: "Commonly speaking, since we keep it strictly stored in a safe, it's not the authorities."
However, the fact that the physical card was in the safe is not the same as saying the card information did not leak. If the number, expiration date, and security code were photographed or copied, the card can be used without taking the physical item.
What needs to be checked are the vault entry and exit logs, seized item transaction logs, employees who viewed the card, presence of photos or copies, date/time of unauthorized use, merchant, terminal, IP address, and inquiry results sent to the credit card company.
If you investigated them and concluded that they are not the authorities, you can show those results. If you answered "obviously not" without investigating, that is not a research result, but merely the personal opinion of the person in charge.
chain of custody for electronic evidence
Electronic data does not become authentic evidence the moment it is printed on paper. What matters is whose device it was acquired from, on what date and time, by what method, whether the hash value was recorded, and who stored and analyzed it.
There is also information that the Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau failed to acquire and migrate terminal data, and claims that the main terminals are overseas and the seized terminals did not include all communications.
If using fragmentary LINE or Telegram logs, the periods of data that could not be retrieved, deleted data, preceding and following conversations, shared accounts, and data gaps must be clarified.
Before discussing the contents of the evidence, please explain that the evidence is the same item, retains its complete context, and has not been tampered with.
Public questions for the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau
- Is the investigation into Mr. Shigenori Kanemoto on October 9, 2025, a regular tax audit or a criminal tax investigation based on a warrant?
- What was the necessity of continuing the investigation past 1:00 AM?
- When and who became aware of Mr. Shigenori Kanemoto's poor physical condition?
- Did you confirm their intention to take a break, pause work, or visit a medical institution?
- Can you identify the name, quantity, serial number, storage location, transfer destination, and return destination for all seized items?
- Can you reproduce the specific breakdown of the items listed with "etc."?
- What is the specific necessity and legal basis for seizing and retaining the original passport?
- Have you conducted an internal investigation regarding credit card fraud?
- Have you inquired with the credit card company about the transaction date and time, merchant, terminal, IP address, etc.?
- If you answered, "It is obviously not the authorities," do you have investigative records to support that judgment?
- Do you record the hash value, operator, software used, and date and time of the work when acquiring electronic data?
- Have you conducted an inspection and investigation into the external leakage of seized items or copied data?
Open letter to the Yokohama District Public Prosecutors Office
- Are you creating an inventory of receipts for the evidence received from the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau and the Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau?
- Were there any discrepancies between the IRS seizure inventory and the items and data actually received by the Yokohama District Public Prosecutors Office?
- Have you received reports regarding the failure to acquire, loss, or corruption of electronic data?
- Have you independently verified the continuity and authenticity of the seized items?
- Did you make the arrest after understanding the suspicions regarding credit card fraud, passport management, and data leaks?
- Do you disclose not only data unfavorable to the suspect, but also the existence of potentially missing favorable data to the defense?
- Are all audio and video recordings of the interrogation being preserved?
- Will you reveal the defects in evidence management in open court?
State organs require a higher level of accountability than "normal."
I stored it normally. Naturally, it shouldn't leak. Naturally, it's not a staff member.
Because there is a suspected failure to maintain that "normality," the management of seized items and the information leak have become issues.
Since a state organ deprives people of their freedom and holds their property and personal information, it requires a higher standard of record-keeping and accountability than the common sense of the general public.
The prosecutors union is not asking for special treatment. They are asking for routine administration: identifying seized items one by one, investigating fraudulent card use, preserving the chain of custody for electronic evidence, and returning passports that are no longer needed.
I would like the Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau and the Yokohama District Public Prosecutors Office to first conduct a normal investigation, keep normal records, and provide normal answers.
