Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau x Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office, the “weakest duo” neutralized their own arrest strategy? Next, will they publicly test everything from extradition and INTERPOL to third-country regulations?
A powerful weapon is strong because the opponent doesn't know about it.
A compulsory investigation is the same.
We will not notify you of the date and time of the arrest in advance.
I won't tell you the search location.
I will not reveal the investigation policy.
We won't even tell you how much evidence we have.
And at the moment the opponent is unable to move, execute it all at once.
This is the basic principle of a forced investigation, isn't it?
However, in this case, the exact opposite is happening.
- Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office
- Fukuoka High Public Prosecutors Office
- Yokohama District Public Prosecutors Office.
- Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau.
- Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau
- Return of Passport.
- Arrest.
- false capital contribution
There have been ongoing assertions that information hinting at this investigative direction was widely circulated through the so-called Mamitsuka memo and other materials even before the coercive measures became effective.
If that is true, it is quite unusual.
Before unleashing the special move, the name of the technique, the target, and the direction of the attack were all known.
How on earth are we going to arrest the accomplices with this?
■First, check the law――How do the passport return order and the arrest warrant connect?
I will organize this accurately.
Article 13, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Passport Act provides that the issuance of a passport, etc., may be restricted for a person who is being prosecuted for a crime punishable by the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a maximum period of two years or longer, or a person for whom the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been notified by relevant agencies that an arrest warrant, warrant of production, detention warrant, or warrant for expert evaluation has been issued on suspicion of such a crime.
And Article 19 of the Passport Act is a mechanism that allows the Minister for Foreign Affairs or a consular officer to order the return of a passport if such circumstances arise after the passport has been issued and they deem it necessary.
In other words, if this recent request by the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office was indeed based on this Passport Act Article 13, Paragraph 1, Item 2 route, the existence of an arrest warrant or the like is not merely speculation.
That is precisely the legal premise.
However, it is necessary to check the publicly available documents to see which specific clause the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office based its request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on.
That is precisely why the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office should clarify the statutory basis.
"We are requesting the return of his passport," the moment Shuji Mizoguchi, Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office, made this public, what did it signal to the world?
This is of great significance.
Assuming it's the Article 13, Paragraph 1, Item 2 route, the moment the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office publicly stated that it is "requesting a passport return order for overseas accomplices," it was practically equivalent to declaring to the world that "the case has progressed to the point where compulsory custody procedures are anticipated."
Furthermore, from the material known as the Mamizuka Memo,
The prosecutor's office is motivated.
Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office
Fukuoka High Public Prosecutors Office
What if even that kind of investigative direction had been leaked beforehand?
From the other person's perspective, it becomes quite easy to predict what will come next.
This does not mean the arrest warrant became "invalid."
Legally, we must make a distinction here.
The mere fact that the surrender of a passport failed does not automatically invalidate the arrest warrant issued by a Japanese judge.
An arrest warrant exists as an arrest warrant.
The problem is more practical.
Useless.
I am not in Japan.
Even with the surrender of the passport, it will not be returned.
In the first place, far from asking questions, the National Tax Agency was even recorded running away from questions asked by an accomplice, and those recordings have been repeatedly broadcast worldwide, so this will not affect residency statuses in many countries either.
If that happens, an arrest warrant that looks like a "powerful weapon" within Japan gets closer to being mere trash when dealing with someone abroad.
Therefore, what may have been neutralized this time is not the arrest warrant itself, but the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office's strategy of connecting the arrest warrant to actual physical detention.
Can an incompetent organization that can only write stories bound by their own procedures conduct a proper investigation?
Was it a one-way street of "revoking the passport -> returning to Japan -> arrest -> interrogation"?
If the original scenario had
- Identify the foreign accomplice.
- Get an arrest warrant.
- Request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to revoke the passport.
- make it difficult to stay abroad.
- Repatriate to Japan.
- Arrest at airports, etc.
- Detain and interrogate, forcing a confession.
If that was the case, it is a very straightforward path, true to the Japanese criminal justice system.
From passport revocation to hostage justice.
However, this single path has a fatal weakness.
If the initial "making it difficult to stay abroad" fails, none of the rest can even begin.
Before playing the trump card of hostage justice, the hostages won't even come to Japan.
There is nothing more ironic than this.
Regarding Japan's criminal justice system, the practice of closely linking physical custody with interrogation has long been criticized as "hostage justice."
However, this time, assuming the subject continues to stay abroad, the surrender of their passport does not lead to returning to Japan, and it does not even result in apprehension, it is a problem that goes beyond the issue of hostage justice.
We cannot even stand at the starting line of hostage justice.
You are under arrest.
Detain.
Ask a question.
Take a statement.
If you were expecting that conventional route, you have stopped at the very first step.
What's more, they leaked that operation to the press club themselves?
Even more ironic is the news coverage.
Originally, from the perspective of investigative agencies, press clubs are places to explain cases to society.
However,
foreign accomplice
Request for passport revocation order
international response
As a result of actively having such information reported,
- On the target audience's side as well,
- Also to foreign lawyers,
- Even to foreign authorities,
It conveys what the Japanese side is trying to do.
In other words, the press clubs, which have hitherto functioned as a source of pressure on taxpayers and suspects, may have this time turned into a mechanism for broadcasting the Japanese side's investigative strategy live to the world.
A brilliant counterattack.
It must have a level of precision that is incomparable to the stories routinely concocted by the National Tax Agency and the public prosecutors, which are called the weakest.
■Why is so much information leaking outside in the case led by former Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau Director Atsushi Kitamura?
Atsushi Kitamura, former head of the Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau, is named as the top official of the bureau at the time in question.
And the Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau Inspection Department.
Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau
Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office
Fukuoka High Public Prosecutors Office
It has been pointed out that information suggesting the movements of these multiple organizations was circulating in advance.
The information regarding the seizure date at the start was missing, and the date of Mr. Kazuyoshi Nakano's arrest this May was also missing, meaning that none of the key figures in the story painted by the prosecution were present at the seizure location.
Normally, it would seem that as an organization grows, its investigative power increases.
However, from the perspective of information management, it is the opposite.
The number of people involved increases.
The number of information sharing destinations will increase.
Documents are increasing.
You will have more people to talk to.
Leakage paths will also increase.
In other words, in this case, the massive joint organization itself may have become a vulnerability in terms of information management.
Whether it's an "unprecedented level of failure" is something for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to answer.
From those involved, there is even harsh criticism regarding this passport revocation handling, calling it "perhaps an unprecedented level of failure."
At this stage, our media outlet cannot definitively state that this is an "unprecedented first" compared to all past records.
Rather, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should explain.
- Did you issue an order for return?
- Haven't you emitted it?
- If it was issued, was it returned?
- What was the deadline?
- Does the target person currently hold a valid passport?
- Why did they not return to their home country?
Once we understand this, we can judge whether it was truly a historical failure or simply a natural outcome of the system.
However, "passport surrender order = routine" is incorrect.
This is also important.
The passport revocation system itself has a history.
Even in the 1960s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself recorded cases where Japanese nationals who committed crimes abroad were forced to surrender their passports and were arrested after returning to Japan.
Meanwhile, when issuing an order for the return of a passport to a Japanese citizen who announced plans to travel to Syria in 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that this case, based on the protection of life and limb, was "the first time ever."
In other words, an order to surrender a passport is not the kind of penalty that is handed out casually on a daily basis.
Because it is also related to the constitutional freedom to travel, it is a heavy measure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself has explained requires careful, case-by-case judgment.
That is precisely why, if they tried to use it in a criminal case and "got no results," it is worth verifying.
And the simplest question—you can ask questions without arresting someone.
There is no need to make this matter complicated.
Cancel the passport.
Repatriate.
You are under arrest.
Detain.
Before that, I have a question.
Under Article 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, public prosecutors may, if necessary for the investigation, request the voluntary appearance of a suspect and conduct an interrogation.
If you are abroad, you can discuss the method.
- Written.
- Agent
- Online.
- International judicial assistance.
- Interviews through local authorities.
At the very least, the law is not written in a way that says "we cannot ask a single question because we cannot make an arrest."
The National Tax Agency is the same—you can ask questions without insisting on face-to-face audits
The same applies to the Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau.
What matters is not whether you were able to meet in person.
Whether you asked the necessary questions.
I will ask questions in writing.
I request an answer.
Request additional materials.
I will check through an agent.
Taxpayers who are abroad will consider methods suited to overseas circumstances.
If they didn't do all that and stopped at "not coming in person," which isn't even a legal obligation, the problem lies with the weak National Tax Agency, which only has a single investigation method.
■The only way for the weakest organization to make a comeback: Ask questions
So, the conclusion of “Chronicles of the National Tax Agency’s Weakest: Part 4” is surprisingly simple.
To make up for it, you don't need an even stronger weapon.
Do not be afraid of accomplices or witnesses, and ask questions online during the trial. Try explaining the past sequence of events with confidence.
That is all.
It's not even an arrest warrant.
It is not even a passport surrender.
It is not even a press club.
First, a question.
Because if an explanation cannot withstand scrutiny regarding a person identified as a key accomplice, it will withstand scrutiny by a foreign government even less.
■ Next, expectations for extradition
However, will they continue to pile on more traditional "heavy-handed measures" from here?
Passport surrender is not working.
Then next is the extradition of criminals.
Request the extradition of a suspect to the other country.
However, things get even more difficult from here on out.
- The legal system of the other country.
- Double criminality
- Political nature of the crime.
- Evidence.
- Procedural due process.
- Extradition treaty.
- Diplomatic relations.
Everything is a problem.
An arrest warrant issued in Japan is not the end of it.
■Next, I have high hopes for INTERPOL
Furthermore,
- INTERPOL
- Red Notice.
- Diffusion
- International wanted notice.
Words like these might come up.
However, INTERPOL is not a machine that converts Japanese arrest warrants into globally universal arrest warrants.
Each country follows its own domestic laws.
INTERPOL also has its own rules.
There is also an appeal system for the targeted person.
In other words, the more internationalized things become, the more the domestic Japanese authority of "the prosecution says so" is diluted, and objective evidence itself comes into question.
■Furthermore, even expecting "third-country travel restrictions."
Passport applications won't stop.
Handover is also difficult.
Even INTERPOL cannot detain him immediately.
That being the case, they would target travel to a third country.
We share entry denial information.
Request extradition from another country.
That kind of idea might come up too.
However, this is the same.
A third country is not Japan's subordinate.
Why is it necessary to detain this person?
I must explain based on the laws of that country.
The IRS recordings of just dodging taxpayers' calls may have already been sent to major investigative agencies and others around the world.
The stronger the measures used, the more the evidence is scrutinized in return.
This is the greatest irony of the international incident.
In Japan, the more compulsory measures are carried out, the stronger the investigative agencies appear.
However, in international incidents, the more you demand strong measures from foreign countries, the more you are asked, "Please show us the basis for that."
If you request the extradition of the criminal, you can see the evidence.
If we use INTERPOL, the nature of the case will be reviewed.
If we ask foreign police for cooperation, we will explain the criminal facts.
If a foreign court is involved, even the legality of the proceedings will be examined.
In other words, the more one goes abroad, the harder hostage justice becomes, shifting instead toward evidence-based justice.
That is why a "grand counterattack" will happen
If the case construction on the Japanese side is strong, there is no problem.
It will be accepted anywhere.
It will be accepted even in foreign courts.
It will even pass through Interpol.
It will even pass the delivery inspection.
Do it with confidence.
However, if the case construction is weak, the more you demand strong international measures, the more the other party will ask, "Where is the evidence?"
If you cannot answer there, the weaknesses that were invisible within Japan will be exposed.
This is a grand counterattack using the press clubs of the National Tax Union and Prosecutors Union for free.
An extremely bizarre case where persons of interest waiting to be arrested are waiting
And what is most bizarre in this case is that from the people involved,
Please ask a question.
Please look at the materials.
I can easily handle cross-examination if necessary.
"If you're going to arrest me, you can explain it during that process. Honestly, I'd rather you arrest me."
That is the sentiment being expressed.
Usually it is the other way around.
Investigative authorities are pursuing.
The witness is fleeing.
However, the witness is waiting.
The National Tax Agency hasn't come.
The prosecution doesn't ask questions either.
Even so,
- Return of Passport.
- Arrest.
- International compatibility.
Only precedes.
This reversal phenomenon may well be the core of the "Chronicles of the National Tax Agency's Weakest."
Before unleashing hostage justice, please start question justice
Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office
Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau.
Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau
What will you serve next?
- Extradition
- INTERPOL
- Apprehension in a third country.
- Further passport measures.
Will you roll them out one by one, be asked for legal grounds and evidence from foreign countries each time, and receive a grand counterattack every single time?
Be that as it may, it is extremely interesting as teaching material for international criminal justice.
However, before doing something that extensive,
There are cheaper, faster, more legal, and more basic investigative methods.
It is an online question during the trial.
To Deputy Chief Prosecutor Shuji Mizoguchi: Since you publicly declared that you "requested the return of the passport," it is time for a reality check.
Shuji Mizoguchi, Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office.
Now that it has been revealed that a passport return order was requested for the overseas accomplice, I want to know the outcome as well.
- Under which provision of the Passport Act was that?
- Was it Article 13, Paragraph 1, Item 2, which presupposes an arrest warrant or the like?
- Did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issue an order?
- Has it been returned?
- Were they sent back to their home country?
- Were they able to make an arrest?
If it hasn't been done, what will you show us next?
■ Atsushi Kitamura, former Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau Chief: Can they overturn the "weakest duo" evaluation?
And the tax evasion investigation that proceeded under former Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau Director Atsushi Kitamura.
National tax
Prosecution.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Press club.
If state agencies were mobilized to this extent, yet there is still no sign of questioning the key accomplice who scripted the narrative themselves, nor has their apprehension been achieved, it is hardly surprising that they are earning the dishonorable label of the "weakest duo."
There is only one way to overturn this.
It is to check the facts.
The era when special moves no longer work has arrived.
Return of Passport.
Arrest warrant.
Press club.
Hostage Justice.
Once, every single one of them looked like a formidable weapon.
However,
- The operation will be leaked.
- The recording remains.
- Foreign authorities will review it.
- The subjects themselves also look up the laws.
- Information is shared all over the world.
That is the kind of era we live in.
Knowing just one special move isn't enough to win.
What's more, if they give away their strategy before firing that finishing move, its power will drop even further.
■ Weakest National Tax Agency Biographies Part 4 — The reason for defeat was not "lack of authority"
It is not that the Kumamoto Regional Taxation Bureau lacks the authority.
It is not that the Kagoshima District Public Prosecutors Office lacks the authority to make arrests.
It is not as if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacks a passport system.
I have everything.
Even if that still doesn't produce results, the problem lies elsewhere.
- Information management
- Evidentiary value.
- Understanding the system.
- The ability to ask questions.
And the ability to test the possibility that our own stories are wrong.
Right there.
From now on,
- Delivery.
- INTERPOL
- Third country.
- Further international cooperation.
Are they going to introduce the lethal techniques of Japan's hostage justice system to the world one after another?
Or will you stop here and ask the very person you called a key accomplice even a single question?
The relevant persons of interest say they are waiting.
Then what we need next is not an arrest warrant.
It is a questionnaire.
Before receiving one of the biggest counterattacks in history once again, can the weakest duo return to the most basic investigation?
Chronicles of the Weakest National Tax Agency Personnel 4.
What will be tested next is not enforcement power.
Courage to ask questions.
